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Abstract. This work investigates the eﬀect of upstream and downstream mar-
ket concentration on retailers’ price-cost margins using bimonthly data over the
period 1989–1992 disaggregated by retailer type and product. In addition to
horizontal concentration, diﬀerentiation, and cost factors, the analysis includes
buyer power amongst the determinants of retailers’ proﬁtability, as a result
of vertical bargaining. Using a ﬁxed eﬀects model in ﬁrst diﬀerences we ﬁnd
evidence of bargaining activity between large chains and food manufacturers.
Our analysis of price competition at the retail level also reveals some interde-
pendence in the pricing decisions of the largest retail organisations and price
leadership by large independent shops.
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Resumen. Este trabajo investiga los efectos de la concentraci´ on de mercado
upstream y downstream sobre el margen precio-costo de los minoristas usan-
do datos bimestrales durante el per´ ıodo 1989–1992 desagregados por tipo de
minorista y producto. Adicionalmente a la concentraci´ on horizontal, la diferen-
ciaci´ on y los factores de costo, el an´ alisis incluye el poder del comprador entre
los determinantes de la rentabilidad de los minoristas, como resultado de la ne-
gociaci´ on vertical. Usando un modelo de efectos ﬁjos en primeras diferencias,
encontramos evidencia de actividad de negociaci´ on entre las grandes cadenas y
los productores de alimentos. Nuestro an´ alisis de la competencia de precios al
nivel minorista tambi´ en revela una cierta interdependencia en las decisiones de
ﬁjaci´ on de precios de las organizaciones minoristas m´ as grandes y liderazgo en
precios por parte de las grandes tiendas independientes.
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1. Introduction
The European grocery trade has been subject to an intensive process of con-
solidation and modernisation in the last twenty years, although at a diﬀerent
pace in diﬀerent countries. Since the mid-1980s Northern European countries
(UK, Scandinavia, France, and Germany) have been developing a modern retail
distribution system, dominated by a few large companies with a relatively small
number of large-size outlets. The modernisation of food distribution in these
countries has been accompanied by a shift in the balance of power from manu-
facturers to retailers (Tordjman, 1994). One of the most evident eﬀects of this
has been an increased ability of the most powerful retailers to impose restrictive
vertical arrangements to manufacturers (Shaﬀer, 1991; Dobson and Waterson,
1997; Clarke, Davies, Dobson, and Waterson, 2002). The behaviour of grocery
retailers and the increasing level of concentration in these countries have raised
competition authorities’ concerns, both at the national and European level
(e.g., Kesko/Tuko merger case in Finland and Competition Commission, 2000,
in the UK).
In Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal) the
modernisation process in grocery retailing has progressed at a slower pace.
The retail distribution systems in these countries are still characterised by low
levels of concentration and by a signiﬁcant presence of traditional outlets. The
Italian grocery trade, in particular, has been dominated by a large number of
small local shops, but has been subject to some relevant changes in the last
twenty years, which are reﬂected in a 40% reduction in the number of outlets
between 1970 and 1990, and by a further 50% reduction between 1991 and 2000.
Furthermore, between 1980 and 2000 a ten-fold increase was observed in the
number of large supermarkets and hypermarkets (Euromonitor, 1980–2003).
This work investigates proﬁtability in the Italian grocery trade, taking into
account the nature of vertical relationships between ﬁrms in the retailing and
manufacturing sectors. The aim of the work is to investigate the nature of
grocery retailers’ pricing behaviour and to identify any evidence of a shift
in the balance of power in favour of retailers, similar to that observed in other
European countries, despite the relatively low concentration levels in the Italian
market.
In addition to the factors traditionally considered when investigating the
determinants of price-cost margins, we shall allow for the possibility that the
retailers’ bargaining power vis-` a-vis manufacturers aﬀects their proﬁt margins.
Anecdotal evidence for the Italian grocery retailing1 indicates that the large
1This emerged from discussion with experts of consumer markets and grocery trade at
ACNielsen and from articles in the general and specialist press.
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and centrally managed retail organisations conduct their bargaining directly
with their suppliers over quantity traded and/or price levels. To reﬂect this
type of vertical interaction our empirical analysis allows for the possibility of
a bargaining process, rather than assuming arm’s length pricing between ver-
tically related industries. The empirical evidence leads us to conclude that the
Italian grocery trade is moving towards the adoption of the practices observed
in the US and Northern European distribution systems.
No systematic analysis of pricing patterns in the Italian grocery retailing has
previously been carried out, due to the limited availability of detailed pricing
information in the public domain. This work relies on detailed information on
the retail prices disaggregated by retailer type and product level, based on
scanner data collected on a regular basis by ACNielsen Italy. The availability
of such detailed information allows us to provide evidence about some of the
predictions in recent theoretical contributions on countervailing power (von
Ungern-Sternberg, 1996, and Dobson and Waterson, 1997).
The data set used contains information about structural and behavioural
features of 6 types of retailers from large, centralised multiples to small, in-
dependent shops. It covers 36 product markets for 19 time periods from 1989
to 1992. Panel data estimation techniques are used to account for the eﬀects
of retailer and product speciﬁc unobservable factors and to address dynamic
pricing issues.
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 contains a brief descrip-
tion of Italian grocery trade, section 3 presents the related literature and the
hypotheses underlying the estimating equation. Section 4 discusses the data
and the estimation method while section 5 contains a discussion of results.
Section 6 concludes.
2. The Italian grocery trade in the European context
The Italian grocery trade has been traditionally characterised by a large
number of small and medium-sized independent shops. In 1995 a food store
served on average 500 inhabitants in Italy and Spain, compared with about
1000 in Germany and 1700 in France and the UK. In 1997 Italy had 150000
independent food retail outlets, three times as many as Germany and ten times
as many as France and the UK. The number of independent outlets had halved
by 2001, so that Italy now has about twice as many outlets as Germany and ﬁve
times as many as France and the UK. Independent retailers represented about
45% of the market in terms of revenue share in 1997, a much lower share
than in 1990 when they represented one third of the market (see Euromonitor,
1992–2003).
Although not as dominant as in Northern European countries, in Italy the
centralised retailing organisations (comprising large chains, voluntary unions,
and buying groups) supplied about 50% of the market in 1996, which represents
a substantial increase from the 25% share of 1990 sales. Over the same period
the market share of food sales in hypermarkets also doubled from 6% to 13%.
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The number of hypermarkets in France, Germany, and the UK was 1000 or
more in 1996, while Italy and Spain only had about 250. Their market share
ranges from 35% in France and the UK to 25% in Germany. The substantial
growth in large retail organisations in recent years seems to indicate that the
Italian market might be moving towards the Northern European system. The
evolution of the Italian grocery trade during the 1990s was characterised by
the emerging role of large multiples, of voluntary and buying groups. While
in 1989 their joint market share was about 30% by 1993 it had increased to
55%, with buying groups doubling their market share from 12% to 25%. This
increased concentration on the buyers’ side of the market is likely to have been
reﬂected in an increased retailer bargaining power, aﬀecting the proﬁtability of
the largest retail organisations.
Despite the evidence of a modernisation process taking place in the Italian
grocery retailing system, little is known about the impact of the changes on the
pricing policies of diﬀerent retailing organisations and in particular about the
impact of the increase in buyer power of centralised organisations and voluntary
groups. This work aims to provide evidence of the eﬀect of seller and buyer
power on food retailers’ margins, over a period of 3 years at the beginning of
the modernisation process in the Italian retailing system.
3. Price-cost margins and bargaining power in the literature
The main determinants of ﬁrms’ price-cost margins have been identiﬁed in
the industrial organisation literature and used extensively as theoretical ref-
erence in empirical work (for a survey, see Martin, 1993). Few attempts have
been made to include the eﬀects of vertical relationships on proﬁtability (see
Waterson, 1980, as an exception).
Traditional models of successive monopoly or oligopoly assume arm’s length
pricing between vertically related industries, ignoring the potential eﬀects of
buyers’ power. In standard oligopoly models with conjectural variations a ﬁrm’s
price-cost margin (Waterson, 1980) depends on the ﬁrm’s market share in
the relevant market (which should capture the ﬁrms’ power as a seller), on
a measure of implicit collusion at the industry level (traditionally represented
by a concentration measure), and on the industry-level price elasticity of de-
mand. This speciﬁcation implicitly assumes arm’s length pricing between ver-
tical levels by assuming that the input price is exogenous to the ﬁrm.2 Recent
contributions have analysed, from a theoretical standpoint, the outcomes of
bargaining processes between the manufacturing and the retailing stage (von
Ungern-Sternberg, 1996, and Dobson and Waterson, 1997), but empirical stud-
ies of industry proﬁtability tend to ignore the vertical dimension.
Bilateral oligopoly models, on the other hand, have been used extensively
2Even when diﬀerent vertical stages are considered the equilibrium value of price-cost
margins in a successive oligopoly model at each stage is identical to the outcome of the
standard oligopoly model with conjectural variation, if the assumption of arm’s length pricing
is maintained (Waterson, 1980).
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in the trade union literature to model the bargaining activity by unions aimed
at extracting ﬁrms’ rents, generated in the ﬁnal market (see Pencavel, 1991,
and Booth, 1995, for recent surveys). When analysing the interactions between
manufacturers and retailers we are dealing with a similar situation of bilateral
power. In the case of retailing both players maximise proﬁt functions (rather
than the wage rate or the wage bill, as in the labour market) and bargain over
the conditions of supply of an intermediate product (which is physically the
same as the ﬁnal product rather than the supply of labour). However, the main
features of the bargaining process in retailing can be modelled in a similar
fashion to the union-ﬁrm bargaining.
Two main models have been adopted for empirical purposes in the trade
union literature to represent vertical bargaining: the right-to-manage or price-
only bargaining, where the transfer price for the goods traded (labour in-
put) does not depend on the quantities exchanged (employment level), and
the eﬃcient bargaining model, leading to an equilibrium solution along a con-
tract curve as a result of bargaining over both price (wage rate) and quantity
(employment level). Diﬀerently from price-only bargaining, this approach to
bargaining potentially generates agreements on quantity discounts (side pay-
ments), which create incentives for the players to maximise their joint pay-oﬀs
(eﬃcient bargaining).
If the transfer price between vertically related industries is determined
through Nash bargaining, it is possible to show that the relative bargaining
power of the upstream level ﬁrm aﬀects the equilibrium value of the price-
cost margin obtained downstream. Several theoretical contributions on these
issues have been provided in the trade-union literature (see Horn and Wolisnki,
1988a and 1988b; Dowrick, 1990a, and Naylor, 2002, for examples of union-ﬁrm
bargaining); however, the theoretical model developed by Svejnar (1986) rep-
resents the main reference for empirical work on eﬃcient bargaining because
it generates testable predictions about the eﬀect on bargaining power (and its
determinants) on the wage share out of total revenue.
In the industrial organisation literature two recent theoretical contributions
(Dobson and Waterson, 1997, and von Ungern-Sternberg, 1996) have focussed
on the relationship between manufacturers and retailers, and have developed
equilibrium solutions for models of sequential bargaining between a monopolist
supplier and an oligopolistic group of retailers. Dobson and Waterson (1997)
assume quantity setting retailers, while von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) assumes
price competition at the downstream level. Due to the complexity of the vertical
relationships analysed these models rely on linear demand functions in order
to generate equilibrium outcomes.
In both cases the vertical bargaining activity involves prices only (simi-
larly to the right-to-manage models of the trade union literature). Based on
these theoretical premises Dobson and Waterson (1997) identify a link between
the players’ relative bargaining power and ﬁnal consumer prices, while von
Ungern-Sternberg (1996) highlights the role of the degree of diﬀerentiation and
the number of ﬁrms at the downstream level as determinants of retail prices.
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These theoretical contributions provide useful guidance for the interpretation
of the empirical results discussed in the next section.
In this work the role of bargaining power will be explicitly included in the
analysis; however, the aim of the work is not to identify the exact nature of
the bargaining process, but rather to provide evidence about the main deter-
minants of retailers’ price-cost margins or revenue share, of which the retailers’
bargaining power is only one element. We will refer to the established results
from the industrial organisationand trade union literature for predictions about
the eﬀect of horizontal and vertical factors on downstream price-cost margins.
Based on these theoretical contributions our empirical analysis will therefore
consider both variables relating to the nature of horizontal competition and
variables reﬂecting the nature of bargaining activity. This approach will allow
us to discriminate between the retail organisations whose proﬁtability reﬂects
the outcome of their vertical bargaining activity and those whose proﬁts are
mainly driven by the nature of horizontal market competition. Furthermore
the nature of inter-ﬁrm rivalry at the downstream level will be analysed in a
dynamic context in order to identify organisations which can be considered as
potential price leaders for the whole industry.
4. Data and estimation method
The empirical analysis of the Italian grocery trade relies on bimonthly retail
data supplied by the marketing company ACNielsen. This type of information,
even at this rather high level of aggregation, is not generally available for aca-
demic purposes, since it is obtained from highly disaggregated scanner data
which are collected for use by private companies for commercial purposes. An-
other advantage of using these data is that they are observed on a regular basis
and are processed according to the same criteria, unlike most of the Italian
data on distribution, even when published by oﬃcial sources.
Six types of retail organisations are considered: large chains, buying groups,
voluntary unions, large independents, other independents, specialist shops,
covering a period of three years from October–November 1989 to October–
November 1992.
The choice of the product classes considered in this work has been deter-
mined by the availability of data on input prices.3 Of the 36 products considered
31 are food products and 5 are detergents/toiletries. Even though this group of
products does not cover the whole range of products traded by retailers, they
are a representative sample of the bundle of goods commonly purchased by an
average Italian household (see list in the appendix). For 6 out of the 36 prod-
uct classes some initial observations are missing, leaving us with an unbalanced
panel of 651 observations.
3Data on producer prices of 43 food and detergent products are collected and published in
the form of a price index by the Italian Association of Chambers of Commerce, on a monthly
basis since 1989. We converted these monthly data into bimonthly observations with common
base year 1990 = 100, to make them consistent with the retail price data. The retail price
data, on the other hand, were converted into price indices with the same base year.
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Six separate equations have been estimated, one for each type of organi-
sation to allow for inter-ﬁrm variability in the estimated coeﬃcients. The role
of rival ﬁrms’ pricing decision is accounted for by including in each equation
lagged values of rival ﬁrms’ prices for each individual product.
Our main estimating equation aims to explain proﬁtability at the retailing
level by referring to the manufacturers’ share of total revenues. Following the
theoretical predictions of the industrial organisation and the trade union liter-
ature we can identify two main sets of determinants of retailers’ proﬁtability:
product market conditions and bargaining power; both sets of determinants
are present in Svejnar’s (1986) wage share equation. Although some determi-
nants are relevant both to the labour market and to the ﬁnal product market
other variables included in our analysis are speciﬁc to the retailing trade. In the
presence of bargaining activity the retailers’ price-cost margin depends on the
retailer’s market share, the degree of horizontal collusion, the degree of prod-
uct diﬀerentiation, demand elasticity, and on the relative bargaining power of
retailers vis-` a-vis manufacturers, as a result of vertical links.




= b0j + b1βjt + b2αjt + b3kjt + b4sijt + b5iWijt + εijt, (1)
where all the variables are expressed as logarithms.
In this equation j identiﬁes the product traded between vertically related
ﬁrms and sold to ﬁnal consumers (j = 1,...,63); i, a generic retailing organ-
isation (i = 1,...,6), and t, the time period (t = 1,...,10). The dependent
variable is obtained as the ratio of p∗
jt (manufacturing prices) and pijt (retail
level prices), and can be interpreted as the manufacturers’ share out of total
revenue. The size of the dependent variable in our estimating equation is af-
fected by the fact that the price in the denominator results from the mark-ups
charged by both wholesalers and retailers. We therefore expect that our results
will underestimate the eﬀects of the explanatory variables in (1), compared to
the estimates which would be obtained if the price ratio could be deﬁned using
information about the size of the wholesalers’ mark-up.
Since this information is not available for our analysis, we have tried to
capture its eﬀect by including among the regressors the proportion of the bi-
monthly purchases which retailers made directly from manufacturers (Wij) as
a proxy for the wholesalers’ mark-up. Our expectation is that the wholesalers’
mark-up will be higher on those products a high proportion of which is ob-
tained directly from manufacturers and therefore a low proportion is bought
through wholesalers. This leads us to predict a negative eﬀect of this variable
on the dependent variable.
βj identiﬁes the manufacturers’ relative bargaining power in product mar-
ket j, αj is a measure of downstream collusion, sij is the market share of
retailer i in product market j. A measure of market-level ﬁnal price-elasticity
is not explicitly included in (1) because this elasticity is assumed to be time-
invariant over the period considered in this work (three years maximum), and
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therefore its eﬀect will be captured by the market-speciﬁc terms (b0j).
Since it is not possible to obtain a direct measure of the manufacturers’
bargaining power (βj), in the estimating equation this variable will be replaced
by those exogenous factors, such as industry-level concentration indexes, which
are likely to aﬀect the bargaining environment, using a similar approach to
Svejnar’s (1986). We proxy the manufacturers’ bargaining power by a con-
centration measure for the relevant product market. The Herﬁndahl index of
manufacturers’ concentration (LHU) was constructed using data on the number
of units and level of employment by class of employment.4
A 3-ﬁrm manufacturers’ concentration ratio was also available for most of
the product markets considered in this work and could have been used as an
alternative to the Herﬁndahl measure,5 but this measure of concentration has
been criticised (Davies, 1984).
This type of measure does not work well in empirical analyses of price-cost
margins6 and in our empirical work was always outperformed by the Herﬁndahl
index. On the basis of the theoretical predictions of the bargaining models
discussed in section 3 we expect to observe a positive eﬀect of the level of
upstream concentration on the manufacturers’ share of total revenues, given
that this variable should reﬂect the manufacturers’ relative bargaining power.
A measure of concentration in the grocery retailing sector (LHD) was ob-
tained by constructing a Herﬁndahl index of concentration based on the squared
value of the market shares, by product type, for the 6 types of organisation
considered in the work. The level of downstream concentration should play an
important role on the determination of the transfer price (p∗
jt) between vertical
stages, given that it should reﬂect the retailers’ bargaining power and should
therefore have a negative eﬀect on the dependent variable. If this is the case,
the expected eﬀect of an increase in downstream concentration should be a
reduction of transfer price, with a negative impact on the dependent variable.
However, the net eﬀect of the concentration measure on the dependent vari-
able will depend on how much of the reduction in transfer price is passed on
to consumers as a reduction in ﬁnal retail prices as a result of the nature of
competition at the downstream level.
Among the variables which can aﬀect the bargaining position of the retailers
vis-` a-vis the manufacturers we also considered the share of each organisation
out of the total purchases in the grocery retailing sector, since we expect that
any discounts granted to speciﬁc retailers are likely to be proportional to the
4Source: Eurostat’s Industrial Yearbook, various issues. The data on employment by
employment class are organised according to the NACE classiﬁcation at the 3-digit level of
aggregation and exclude ﬁrms with less than 20 employees. This implies that our Herﬁndahl
measure is likely to be biased upwards (Waterson, 1980).
5Market shares for most of the product classes in 1988–1990 in Italy have been obtained
from Euromonitor publications; Nielsen provided data on market shares for the years 1991–
1993.
6As shown for instance in Nickell and Metcalf (1978), where it is also shown that the cor-
relation between the Herﬁndahl index and the 5-ﬁrm concentration ratio, commonly used to
measure concentration in previous price-cost margins studies, is quite low. See also Sleuwagen
and Dehandschutter (1986) for a more general discussion.
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amounts purchased as a proportion of the manufacturers’ total sales to the
retailing sector.
The individual market share of diﬀerent retailers included in (1) may also
capture relevant aspects of the nature of horizontal competition. While
one would expect that an increase in market share by increasing the seller’s
power would lead to an increase in ﬁnal prices, in the presence of bargaining
activity this outcome might be reversed.
As suggested by von Ungern-Sternberg (1996), a decrease in the number of
retailers, allowing for an increase in the remaining ﬁrms’ market share, might
generate a more intense price competition between retailers, especially when the
market is characterised by the presence of larger retailers who are able to
obtain lower transfer prices and who tend to charge lower prices. A similar
eﬀect would also be observed in the presence of high levels of concentration
at the downstream level. The overall eﬀect of downstream concentration on
the manufacturers’ share of total revenue will therefore depend on whether the
bargaining power eﬀect (inducing a reduction in transfer prices) will dominate
the horizontal competition eﬀect (leading to a reduction in ﬁnal prices).
To provide a more complete insight into the horizontal dimension of price
competition, we tried to account for strategic interactions across retailers by
including in each equation lagged values of the prices of rival retailing organi-
sations.
Dobson and Waterson (1997) highlight the importance of the degree of dif-
ferentiation amongst retailers as a determinant of ﬁnal prices, in the presence
of vertical bargaining. Indeed, their model of bilateral oligopoly predicts a pos-
itive relationship between ﬁnal retail prices and the degree of diﬀerentiation
between retailers, for any given number of retailers.
We have tried to account for the fact that diﬀerent types of retail organ-
isation oﬀer diﬀerent services to consumers (e.g., range of brands, variety of
products, type of display, check-out systems, parking space, attention to the
individual customer, etc.) by including in the analysis a series of variables re-
lating to the number and size of shops belonging to each organisation. For the
six organisations analysed we can observe the total number of shops for each
organisation and the number of small (< 200m2), medium, and large shops
(> 400m2) belonging to each retail organisation.
Organisations characterised by a high number of small shops are likely to be
conveniently located with respect to consumers’ location and to be able to
oﬀer a more personal high quality service, while organisations dominated by
larger shops are likely to provide a better range of products, parking facilities,
etc. In general, one would expect that in organisations with many small-sized
shops the degree of diﬀerentiation would be low and that consumers would
consider the diﬀerent small shops as highly substitutable. However, it is also
possible to observe high levels of loyalty amongst the customers of the small
shops which provide personal attention to the customer, more diﬃcult to oﬀer
in large retailing outlets.
In the light of these consideration our prediction, in terms of service dif-
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ferentiation, would be that lower levels of ﬁnal prices are more likely to be
observed in organisations with large shops characterised by lower levels of cus-
tomer loyalty. However, we are aware that the variables used to measure the
retailers’ diﬀerentiation provide only an indirect measure of this concept and
therefore they are not appropriate to estimate the direction of the eﬀect pre-
dicted by Dobson and Waterson (1997). Their inclusion in the analysis mainly
aims to avoid a potential omitted variables bias in the estimation.
Finally, as measures of the cyclical activity we considered alternatively quar-
terly data on the unemployment rate, the index of industrial production, and
the growth rate of total real consumer expenditure. An attempt was also made
to consider the fact that large selling areas imply a more eﬃcient use of re-
sources and therefore the proportion of “modern” types of shops (large selling
area, free service, equipped with scanners, etc.) was included among the ex-
planatory variables. The cost associated with holding the stock of goods sup-
plied to ﬁnal consumers has been measured by using the stock level held in
each period and an index of the number of months required to eliminate the
stock.
The non-random nature of the sample used in this work led us to assume
ﬁxed individual (product-speciﬁc) eﬀects.7 In our model consistency will be
deﬁned in terms of the time dimension, given that we consider the number of
markets to be logically limited.
Equation (1) was estimated in ﬁrst diﬀerences for all retailers. The ﬁrst dif-
ference transformation is commonly adopted in the empirical literature follow-
ing Anderson and Hsiao (1982), to reduce the number of estimated parameters
in a ﬁxed eﬀect model, although it introduces an MA(1) error process.
The instrumental variables estimation method was adopted, accounting for
the potential endogeneity of the market share variable. The instruments used
were the number of shops belonging to the retailing organisation and the pro-
portion of branded to own label goods sold, since these variables are determined
as the result of long term decisions on outlet expansion and own label product
development which are not aﬀected by short term decisions about the level of
price or margins and can therefore be considered as exogenous.
The validity of the instruments was evaluated on the basis of the Sargan
statistic. The 2-step estimator was used for all the regression equations, in
order to obtain eﬃcient estimates in the presence of heteroskedasticity. The
specialist shop equation was estimated by OLS, due to the lack of signiﬁcance
of the market share variable.
A summary of the estimated coeﬃcients and their signiﬁcance level for each
type of retail organisation is provided in table 1. In all cases there is no evidence
of dynamic misspeciﬁcation, according to the AR(2) statistic for second order
serial correlation (see Arellano and Bond, 1991) and to the Sargan test,8 a test
7The choice of this speciﬁcation is also justiﬁed by potential correlation between the
regressors and the error term, given that some explanatory variables might be endogenous.
On this issue, see Hsiao, 1986, pp. 43–45.
8The Sargan test is distributed as a χ2, with p − k degrees of freedom, where p is the
number of instruments and k is the number of regressors.
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Table 1. Summary of regression results (2-step estimates)
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of overidentifying restrictions.
Given the choice of ﬁrst diﬀerence speciﬁcation all the variables included in
the regression equations measure the rate of change in the original variables,
and given the logarithmic transformations the estimated coeﬃcients can be
interpreted as elasticities.
5. Discussion of results
As far as the theoretical predictions of section 3 are concerned, in the large
chains equation can we identify a signiﬁcant eﬀect of manufacturers’ concen-
tration (LHU) on retailers’ price-cost margins, a result which seems to provide
support for the hypothesis of bargaining activity. For all the other retailers,
excluding specialist shops, both downstream concentration (LHD) and market
shares (LSV) have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on price-cost margins, but upstream con-
centration (LHU) does not. This result is consistent with the fact that most of
the Italian grocery retailers are not (yet) suﬃciently powerful to be able to en-
gage directly in bargaining activities with the food manufacturers. Apart from
large chains, the prevailing form of vertical interaction seems to be characterised
by arm’s length pricing and the retail margins mostly driven by the nature of
horizontal competition.
For all the types of retail organisation, with the exception of large chains, the
impact of increases in market share (LSV) on ﬁnal price is negative, while the ef-
fect of downstream concentration level (LHD) is positive. This might reﬂect the
fact that increases in individual organisations’ market shares are reﬂected in
higher ﬁnal prices as a result of increased sellers’ power. On the other hand,
an increase in industry concentration levels might lead to a situation of more
intense price competition between larger retailers who are able to obtain lower
transfer prices from manufacturers and tend to charge lower prices, as suggested
by von Ungern-Sternberg (1996) when discussing the relationship between ver-
tical bargaining and horizontal competition.
The estimated coeﬃcients associated with the share of purchases (LSPU)
diﬀer in sign between large chains and the other types of retailers (voluntary
unions and independent shops). Only for large chains does an increase in the
share of total purchases generate a decrease in the manufacturers’ share of rev-
enues, while for all the other types of retailers the opposite result is observed.
This result can be considered as indirect evidence of the ability of large chains
to obtain more favourable terms from manufacturers when they increase the
volumes purchased (quantity discounts).
For buying groups and both types of independent shops an increase in the
time required to deplete the existing stock signiﬁcantly aﬀects the price-cost
margin. This result can be interpreted as a higher retail price being charged
for those products which have low turnover and therefore imply higher cost of
stock management. For large chains, other independent, and specialist shops we
observe a pro-cyclical behaviour of retail prices, although in the case of other
independents a period of about two months is required for prices to adjust to
Rev. Econ. Ros. Bogot´ a (Colombia) 10 (2): 109–125, diciembre de 2007M. GIULIETTI 121
cyclical variations in consumption. The specialist shops’ performance appears
to be driven mainly by cyclical factors, such as the growth rate of consumption,
and competitive factors, such as the prices charged by independent shops.
None of the variables used to capture the eﬀects of product/service diﬀeren-
tiation across retailers (number of shops, average size of the shops, number of
modern shops) turned out to be signiﬁcant for any retail organisation. However,
we are aware that these variables are only imperfect measures of the diﬀerences
in service quality across retailers.
When we look at the eﬀect of rival’s pricing behaviour on each retailer or-
ganisation’s pricing behaviour our results indicate that large chains, buying
groups, and voluntary unions seem to engage in horizontal strategic interac-
tion through prices. Indeed, past changes in retail prices by buying groups
and voluntary unions generate variations in the same direction in large chains’
prices. Also, changes in prices by large chains and independent retailers gen-
erate changes in buying groups’ price in the same direction. The asymmetric
nature of the reaction to price changes between large chains and voluntary
unions seems to indicate an attempt by voluntary unions to avoid direct com-
petition over prices with large chains, possibly by providing a diﬀerent type of
in-store service.
To sum up, our results seem to reveal some form of interdependence in
pricing decisions among the large and centralised retailers, and symmetry in
the price changes of most retail organisations. Large independents’ prices sig-
niﬁcantly aﬀect all the rivals’ prices, with the exception of large chains. Only
changes in buying groups’ prices are relevant for large independents’ pricing de-
cisions. These empirical results do not allow us to identify a clear price leader
in the market, although large independents seem to play a relevant role in the
pricing behaviour of most rival retailers.
Finally, to allow for the possibility that the slope parameters are not con-
stant across markets, some of the explanatory variables have been interacted
with product market dummies in order to capture eﬀects that are speciﬁc to
particular product markets. For instance, we have tried to account for the fact
that own label products might be relevant only in some of the markets con-
sidered. This was achieved by multiplying the market-speciﬁc dummies by the
share of branded goods to total goods supplied in each type of organisation
and also in the whole distribution system. However, none of the multiplicative
terms included in the regression equation turned out to be signiﬁcant.
6. Conclusions
We analyse the determinants of grocery retailers’ proﬁtability using data
on six Italian grocery retail organisations over the period 1989–1992, taking
into account both horizontal and vertical factors. The purpose of the analysis
was to identify the main determinants of grocery retailers’ price-cost margins,
including the nature of horizontal competition between retailers and the eﬀect
of vertical pricing arrangements with suppliers.
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One of the most interesting and original results of the empirical work is the
identiﬁcation of a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the structure of the manufacturing sector
on the proﬁtability of large chains. Although alternative explanations are pos-
sible, this result seems to be consistent with the recent theory of countervailing
power, which identiﬁes a potential role for manufacturers’ bargaining power in
the determination of retailers’ proﬁtability.
Our evidence is consistent with bargaining activity between large grocery
retail chains and food manufacturers. This leads us to conclude that the as-
sumption of parametric transfer price (arm’s length pricing) is inappropriate for
the analysis of proﬁtability in some vertically related markets. This result can
be interpreted as an indication that the Italian grocery trade is moving towards
those forms of vertical relationship which have been observed in less traditional
distribution systems (such as the US and Northern Europe). It might even be
an indication that in the future large chains will be able to acquire a domi-
nant role to the detriment of more traditional forms of retailing, due to their
preferential supply conditions.
We were also able to identify some pattern of price interactions across dif-
ferent retailers. Our results indicate a potential role of price leaders for large
independents, since variations in their prices aﬀect the pricing decision of all
the rival retailers except for large chains. Furthermore the pricing decisions of
large chains, voluntary unions, and buying groups appear to be highly interde-
pendent and symmetric. However, a more detailed analysis of causality issues,
which is beyond the scope of this work, would be required to identify situations
of interdependence or price leadership in more precise terms.
Although our empirical analysis covers only a limited period of time it seems
to be consistent not only with related theoretical contributions but also with
retail analysts’ view about the current state of vertical relations in the Italian
grocery trade. However, access to more extensive time series, covering several
years, would allow us to ﬁnd more evidence on the change over time in the
relative bargaining power of retailers.
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Appendix
List of variables appearing in the estimating equation
(All the variables are in ﬁrst diﬀerences)
Dependent variable:
LPR: logarithm of the ratio of manufacturers’ to retailers’ price.
Explanatory variables:
LHU: logarithm of the Herﬁndahl index of concentration at the upstream level
(manufacturing).
LHD: logarithm of the Herﬁndahl index of concentration at the downstream
level (retailing).
LSV: logarithm of the market share in value in each product market for each
type of organisation.
GRC: growth rate of total consumption.
STKI: index of stock, indicating how many months are required to eliminate
the current stock in each type of organisation.
LSPU: logarithm of the share of total purchases (all retailers) made by each
type of organisation.
LP*: logarithm of the retailers’ price charged by retailer *, where * stands for
large chains (LC), buying groups (BG), voluntary unions (VU), large
independent (LI), other independent (OI), specialist shop (SS), respec-
tively.
List of product classes
1) durum wheat pasta 13) gorgonzola cheese 25) grocery coﬀee
2) biscuits 14) stracchino cheese 26) canned tomatoes
3) rice (packets) 15) mozzarella 27) canned peas and beans
4) canned meat 16) vegetable oil 28) frozen vegetables
5) stock cubes 17) olive oil 29) frozen ﬁsh
6) Parma ham 18) virgin olive oil 30) jams and preserves
7) salami 19) butter 31) canned tuna
8) mortadella 20) margarine 32) laundry detergent
9) UHT milk 21) mineral water 33) washing-up liquid
10) yoghurt 22) fruit juices 34) toothpaste
11) parmesan cheese 23) table wine 35) soap
12) provolone cheese 24) beer 36) nappies
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